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COMMENT
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence: Washington
Gives At Will Employees A Gun With No
Ammunition To Fight Against Unjust
Dismissal
Nelson works in the computer sales department of X Cor-
poration, a computer processing firm. He started out at the
company as a delivery boy fifteen years ago, but through hard
work and determination he has gradually advanced to his cur-
rent position. Nelson does not have a formal contract with X
Corporation establishing the length or conditions of his service,
but he has always assumed that the company would never fire
him as long as he continued to do a good job.
Mr. Leith, an executive at X Corporation, knows little
about Nelson's long record of exemplary service. Leith does
know, however, that he has promised his nephew, Tyler, a
good paying job in the company. Although his nephew is
unqualified for a computer sales position, Leith fires Nelson
and gives Tyler the job.
Nelson is shocked. Although he has done nothing wrong,
he finds himself unemployed with no way to support his fam-
ily. He calls you and asks for legal help in getting his job back.
As a legal practitioner in the state of Washington, what do you
tell him?
Under current state and federal law,' the answer is quite
simple: Nelson has no legal means of recourse. He is an "at
will" employee and, as such, the employment relationship can
1. Although this Comment focuses primarily on Washington law, federal
procedures for wrongful discharge are important for several reasons. First,
Washington and other states have traditionally relied on federal courts for guidance in
developing their own wrongful discharge procedures. See, e.g., Roberts v. ARCO, 88
Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977); see also infra Section III. Second, federal courts
created the first exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. See inifra Section I.
Third, federal means of recovery exist in addition to state causes of action, so many
complaints contain both federal and state claims. See, e.g., Bishop v. Jellef Assoc., 398
F.Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
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be terminated by either party at any time for almost any rea-
son. As will be shown, while the traditional at will doctrine2
has been weakened by several exceptions, cases similar to the
hypothetical above continue to fall through the cracks. The
result is an arguably unfair termination that finds no remedy
in Washington statutory or common law.
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed the
issues of at will employment and unjust dismissal in Baldwin
v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.3 In its decision,
the court took a step forward by granting unjust dismissal
plaintiffs greater procedural rights, but then rendered that
progress largely meaningless by refusing to recognize substan-
tive rights that would broaden the protections against unjust
dismissal. The net result is that only the few unjustly termi-
nated employees who are able to survive a summary judgment
motion will benefit from the more equitable procedural bur-
dens during trial. Thus, unfortunately, the courtroom doors
remain closed to many other deserving employees whose ter-
minations do not fit the substantive requirements for redress
under the at will doctrine.
In Baldwin, the court addressed three main issues: one
procedural and two substantive. Procedurally, the court wisely
adopted a system of shifting evidentiary burdens for use in
unjust dismissal suits. The shifting burdens provide an
employee with a more realistic chance of reaching trial on the
merits.
However, the court denied most at will employees a sub-
stantive basis for utilizing this procedural change by refusing
to recognize the existence of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the at will employment relationship. The
court's failure to recognize that employment at will is actually
an employment contract, under which the parties should be
subject to the same obligations of good faith as in ordinary con-
tracts, was based on a flawed logic that used the employment
at will doctrine to validate itself.
Although the court's flawed reasoning lead it to reject an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it did expand
the substantive rights of employees whose employers have
promised that dismissal will be only for "just cause." The
2. The at will doctrine is commonly referred to as "employment at will" and
"terminable at will." This Comment will use the terms interchangeably.
3. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989).
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court authorized judicial review of an employer's determina-
tion that just cause for termination of an employee existed.
Unfortunately, this substantive gain was undercut when the
court held that an employer's good faith belief that it had just
cause to dismiss an employee was sufficient to satisfy the just
cause standard.
This Comment will explore the status of the employment
at will doctrine and unjust dismissal actions following the
supreme court's decision in Baldwin. First, Section I will
explain the historical background of the employment at will
doctrine and its steady erosion in the modern era. Next, Sec-
tion II will provide an overview of the Baldwin case itself,
including facts, procedural history, and general holdings. Sec-
tions III through V will explore the three major issues decided
by the court in Baldwin: allocating burdens of proof in wrong-
ful discharge suits; implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing in employment at will contracts; and the standard for
determining when an employer has "just cause" for firing an
employee. Finally, in Section VI, the author will suggest legis-
lative action to correct the inadequacies of the post-Baldwin
employment at will doctrine.
I. HISTORICAL BASIS OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
Roughly two-thirds of the American workforce are consid-
ered terminable at will.4 The at will doctrine originated in the
late 19th Century when American commentator Horace G.
Wood stated that "a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie
a hiring at will."' Although Wood's theory contradicted Eng-
lish common law6 and was not supported by any American
courts,7 his proposition gradually gained nationwide approval.'
4. Estimates vary, but approximately 60 to 65 percent of all employees are hired
on an at will basis. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1816
nn.1-2, 1827 n.65 (1980); Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment At Will, 36 LAB.
L.J. 557, 558 (1985) (estimate that 60 million United States employees are subject to
employment at will).
5. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MAsTER AND SERVANT 134 (1877).
6. English courts consistently ruled that a general hiring implied a term of one
year. Continuation of employment for longer than one year made the employment
terminable only at the end of an additional year. Comment, Implied Contract Rights
to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340 (1974).
7. Id. at 341; see Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891).
8. The Tennessee Supreme Court provided perhaps the earliest cogent definition
of an employment at will contract when it wrote that an employer could terminate an
employee "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without [the
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Wood's conception of the at will doctrine synthesized
many of the legal and social theories of the late 19th Century:
freedom of contract, laissez-faire economics, and mutuality of
contract. Mutuality of contract, in which both the employer
and employee could terminate the employment relationship at
any time, was the argument most often advanced by courts to
support the at will doctrine. The United States Supreme Court
advocated this theory in Adair v. United States,9 noting "[iln
all such particulars the employer and employe [sic] have equal-
ity of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no
government can legally justify in a free land."1
The at will doctrine was ideally suited to the economic
conditions extant during its emergence: rapid business expan-
sion westward lured many employees away from their previous
jobs, temporary agricultural jobs were still common, and most
workers did not spend long periods working for a single
employer. 1 By the beginning of the early 20th Century, how-
ever, the economic conditions had changed to the extent that
employees were clearly disadvantaged by the at will rule.'2
Employees began to remain with the same company for long
periods of time. In addition, periods of high unemployment
hampered discharged employees from finding other jobs, Most
importantly, rapid industrialization shifted power to large cor-
porate employers, an event that virtually invalidated the idea
of absolute freedom of contract. 3
Courts and legislatures, faced with a changed economic
setting and an employment principle ill-suited to the new real-
employer] being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Hutton v. Watters, 132
Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). For a thorough discussion of the development of
employment at will, see Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118 (1976).
9. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). Adair challenged a federal law forbidding employers
involved in interstate commerce from discharging employees because of union
membership. The Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. Id. at 175.
10. Id. at 175. The Court later retreated from the position that all such legislation
would be unlawful, but the Court's earlier statement epitomizes the pattern of thought
on the subject. See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
11. See Comment, Employment At Will: Just Cause Protection Through
Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REV. 151, 153 (1987).
12. Earlier commentators and courts were not so much concerned with freedom of
the employee, but with the fundamental right of employers to discharge employees as
they pleased. See Comment, supra note 6, at 343 (1974).
13. See Blades, Employment At-Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1418 (1967).
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ity, gradually placed limitations on the employment at will
doctrine. The first attempts to limit the doctrine were made
by the New Deal Congress, largely because the concept of at
will employment had become so entrenched in the common
law that courts were reluctant to modify or eliminate it. In
1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, 4
which prohibited certain employers from discharging employ-
ees who engaged in such acts as organizing, bargaining collec-
tively, and striking.1" Since then, Congress has legislated
several other exceptions to the at will rule,16 but all have dealt
with particular classes of employees, such as union members,
women, and minorities.' 7 Conversely, although the courts have
been more reluctant to join the fray until recently, the com-
mon law exceptions they have created have attacked the at
will doctrine across the board without focusing on a particular
class of employees.
A. Judicial Exceptions to Employment At Will
Courts, recognizing the severity of the at will doctrine,
have created narrow exceptions to the rule that allow termi-
nated employees to seek redress in specific situations. The
most widely recognized exceptions are for public policy and
implied-in-fact contracts.
1. The Public Policy Exception
A substantial majority of courts recognize an exception to
the at will doctrine when the employer's discharge of an
14. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § § 151-162 (1982)).
15. The Supreme Court explicitly supported the position that some limitations
were necessary for the at will doctrine, stating that the National Labor Relations Act
did not interfere with the "normal" right of discharge but was only intended to
prohibit employers from using the right of discharge as a means to "intimidate or
coerce employees." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
16. Congress also passed the Child Labor Law, § 12, 52 Stat. 1067 (1938) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1982)) and the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § § 151-64 (1982)). The most far-reaching effort by
Congress to limit the at will doctrine was the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1982 & Supp. 1986)). The Civil
Rights Act prohibits employers from discharging employees because of race, color,
national origin, religion, or sex. Congress also passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, which prohibits the dismissal of employees due to age. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (1970).
17. The reason why Congress has only acted to protect certain groups from the at
will doctrine is not clear. Possible reasons include the state-law nature of contracts,
constitutional limitations on the authority of Congress to affect employment relations,
and the political pressures affecting the passage of new legislation.
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employee violates fundamental principles of public policy."8
Under this exception, employees have a cause of action in tort
for wrongful discharge if they are dismissed for activities that
are deemed protected by public policy. This exception to the at
will rule was explained in one of the earliest "public policy"
cases, Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.9
In Peterman, an employee was fired following his refusal to
commit perjury on behalf of his employer. The court stated
that allowing an employer to discharge an employee for refus-
ing to commit a crime would be "obnoxious to the interests of
the State and contrary to public policy and sound morality."20
However, the Peterman court did not adopt an exception
for public policy out of concern for the rights of the employee
but to protect the state's interest in discouraging perjury. The
court believed that allowing employers to fire employees for
refusing to commit perjury would discourage truthful testi-
mony. It held, therefore, that public policy requires that every
legal obstacle to honest testimony be "struck down when
encountered."2
The reasoning of the Peterman court is representative of
one approach courts have used to define public policy. The
Peterman court, and some later courts,2 2 made ad hoc determi-
nations of whether public policy mandated a wrongful dis-
charge action in the particular case before them. In cases like
these, courts make a determination that a state or federal
interest overrides the employer's right to terminate. Usually,
the employees have refused to commit a crime."3
Under another approach, courts base public policy excep-
tions on the legislature's express designation of statutory rights
and duties. Many courts have used this method when an
employee has been fired for filing a workers' compensation
18. A state by state summary of the status of the at will rule appears in Wald &
Wolf, Recent Developments in the Law of Employment At Will, 1 LAB. L.J. 533, 555-79
(1985).
19. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), aff'd on remand, 214 Cal. App. 2d 155,
29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1963).
20. Id. at 186, 344 P.2d at 27.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839,
610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (refusal to participate in price-fixing); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (refusal to violate state statute
regulating the labeling of food products).
23. See cases cited supra note 22. See also Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton
R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to alter sampling results
used for pollution control reports).
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25claim' 4 or serving on a jury. The need for an exception to the
at will rule in these cases receives even greater support
because the relevant legislature has indicated that public policy
allows or requires the conduct.2 6
2. The Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception
A large number of courts have also adopted a contractual
exception to the employment at will doctrine. Under this
exception, an employer's agreement to terminate only for just
cause creates rights enforceable in contract.27 Such an agree-
ment by employers is often inferred from company handbooks
or policy statements that establish procedures or conditions to
be followed in termination decisions. Such inferences give rise
to the implied-in-fact contract exception. Courts have labeled
the inferences from the handbook provisions "implied-in-fact
covenants of good faith and fair dealing" because the employer
unilaterally submits a guarantee not to dismiss without just
cause. 2s Thus, employers can maintain only a traditional at
will relationship by refraining from making binding
statements.
3. Exceptions to the At Will Doctrine in Washington
For many years Washington adhered to the traditional at
will doctrine, recognizing only those exceptions specified by
24. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
25. See Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Nees
v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
26. Other courts have argued that since an at will employee may be terminated
for any reason, the impropriety of the reason is legally irrelevant. See Kelly v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 875 (Miss. 1980); Andress v. Augusta
Nursing Facilities, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 775, 776, 275 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1980).
27. See Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980). Other courts utilizing this principle include Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev.
594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257
(1985); Mobil Coal Prod., Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
28. Because the exception is grounded in contract, traditional notions of offer,
acceptance, and consideration must be fulfilled:
A promise of job security contained in an employee handbook distributed
by an employer to its employees constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract;
and an employee's continuing to work, while under no obligation to do so,
constitutes an acceptance and sufficient consideration to make the employer's
promise binding and enforceable.
Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W. Va. 1986).
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the Congress or Washington legislature.' Along with the fed-
eral statutory exceptions previously mentioned, ° Washington
courts recognize wrongful discharge actions by employees fired
because of their age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color,
national origin, or mental or physical handicap in violation of
Washington law.3 '
In addition to the statutory exceptions, in Roberts v.
ARCO, 2 the Washington Supreme Court discussed the excep-
tion for instances when an employee gives additional consider-
ation."3 The additional consideration exception is similar to
the implied-in-fact contract exception discussed in the previous
section but is based on actions of the employee instead of the
employer. This exception is available only if the employee has
provided consideration in addition to required services that
results in a detriment to the employee and a benefit to the
employer.s4 If the employee has given additional considera-
tion, the employer is no longer free to terminate the employ-
ment relationship at will. In Roberts, the court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion that longevity of service, rejection of other
job opportunities, and numerous transfers were sufficient addi-
tional consideration to satisfy this exception to the at will doc-
trine but declined to give examples of sufficient acts. 5
In response to the plaintiff's suggestion that Washington
adopt the public policy exception,3 6 the Roberts court acknowl-
edged that the exception had gained support in other jurisdic-
tions, 7 but noted that it was intended to apply only where
29. See Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977); Webster v.
Schauble, 65 Wash. 2d 849, 400 P.2d 292 (1965); Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture
Co., 46 Wash. 2d 408, 281 P.2d 832 (1955).
30. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1989) ("Age was added by amendment in 1961).
32. 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977). Roberts had worked for ARCO for 16
years when he was dismissed at age 42. Roberts alleged that ARCO discriminated
against him because of his age and that the circumstances of his employment created
an implied condition that he would not be terminated in bad faith. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for ARCO.
33. Washington courts had long recognized that an employee could make his
employment terminable for cause only by giving additional consideration. See
Heideman v. Tall's Travel Shops, Inc., 192 Wash. 513, 73 P.2d 1323 (1937).
34. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d at 895, 568 P.2d at 769.
35. Id. at 895-96, 568 P.2d at 769.
36. Roberts asserted that dismissing an employee because of his age violates public
policy. Id. at 896, 568 P.2d at 770.
37. Id. at 896-97, 568 P.2d at 770 (citing Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) and Peterman v. Int'l Brd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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adherence to the employment at will doctrine would lead to an"outrageous result clearly inconsistent with a stated public pol-
icy and the community interest."'  The court reasoned that
because the plaintiff's termination did not result from the
exercise of a statutory right or refusal to commit a criminal
act, his discharge was not wrongful under the public policy
exception. 39  Thus, although the Roberts court did not
expressly adopt the public policy exception, it indicated that it
would do so if faced with the right situation.
That situation arose in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Com-
pany,4° in which the court adopted the public policy and
implied-in-fact contract exceptions to the at will doctrine. In
Thompson, an employee worked for the defendant for seven-
teen years before he was dismissed for "stepping on some-
body's toes. '41 Thompson argued that he gave the employer
additional consideration when he assigned any inventions or
patents obtained during his employment to the company, but
the court disagreed, stating that the consideration was insuffi-
cient to change an at will relationship to one terminable only
for cause.42
The major issue in Thompson concerned the legal effect of
a "Policy and Procedural Guide" published by the employer
which promised that terminations would be handled in a "fair,
reasonable, and just" manner.4 3 The court recognized that the
at will theory allowed for qualification of an employer's right
to terminate by statements contained in employee policy
manuals" and that contractual analysis independently justi-
fied such a limitation.45
Moreover, the court stated that broader based policy con-
siderations also justified this exception. Because employers
38. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d at 897, 568 P.2d at 770.
39. Id.
40. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
41. Id. at 221, 685 P.2d at 1083. The plaintiff had advanced to the position of
divisional controller and had received regular bonuses and, two months before his
dismissal, a merit pay raise. Following termination, he was given a $10,000 bonus for
his previous performance. Id.
42. Id. at 224, 685 P.2d at 1084. The court compared the present case to Parker v.
United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982), in which the plaintiff had
similarly assigned rights to inventions to the defendant company. The Parker court
stated, "[these terms and conditions merely defined the required services, put Parker
on notice, and indicated her common law liability." Id. at 726, 649 P.2d at 183.
43. Thompson, 102. Wash. 2d at 222, 685 P.2d at 1084.
44. Id. at 228, 685 P.2d at 1087.
45. Id. at 229, 685 P.2d at 1087.
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primarily issue such manuals to create an atmosphere of fair
treatment and job security for their employees,46 and because
employers expect employees to abide by the policies expressed
in the manuals, employers can create an atmosphere where
employees justifiably rely on the express terms of the manual
and expect that the employer will adhere to the procedures
stated in the manual.4 7 Thus, the Thompson court held that if
an employer creates an atmosphere of job security and fair
treatment with "promises of specific treatment in specific situ-
ations" and the employee relies on the representations, the
employer must act in accord with those promises.'
In addition to the additional consideration and implied-in-
fact contract exceptions, the Thompson court also considered
whether Washington should adopt the public policy exception
to employment at will. Although the court indicated that it
would be willing to adopt the exception, the justices were con-
cerned that a broad definition of public policy would not bal-
ance the interests of both the employer and employee. 49. To
accommodate this concern, the court stated that the employer's
conduct violates public policy if it contravenes a constitutional,
statutory, or regulatory provision.' Prior judicial decisions can
also establish public policy, the court added, but without judi-
cial or legislative declarations to guide them, courts should pro-
ceed cautiously.5' With this ruling, the Thompson court added
Washington to the list of states that allow an action in tort for
wrongful discharge when the dismissal violates a clear man-
date of public policy.52
46. Id. (citing Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 726-27, 649 P.2d
181, 183-84 (1982)).
47. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088. The court indicated that employees could
"reasonably" rely on policies that are specifically announced by the employer and by
which the employees are also expected to abide.
48. Id. (emphasis in original.) For an excellent analysis of the employment
handbook exception with specific emphasis on Thompson and subsequent cases, see
Wall, At-Will Employment in Washington: A Review of Thompson v. St. Regis and its
Progeny, 14 UNIV. OF PUGET SOUND L. REv. 71 (1990). Recent cases interpreting and
applying Thompson include Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash. App. 261, 792 P.2d 545
(1990); Hatfield v. Columbia Fed. Say. Bank, 57 Wash. App. 876, 790 P.2d 1258 (1990);
Hibbert v. Centennial Villas, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 889, 786 P.2d 309 (1990); and Swanson
v. Liquid Air Corp., 55 Wash. App. 917, 781 P.2d 900 (1989).
49. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
50. Id. (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625,
631 (1982).
51. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
52. The Washington Supreme Court recently clarified its position on the public
policy exception in Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash. 2d 612, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989). In
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Thus, although the Thompson court left the at will doc-
trine firmly rooted in Washington law, several exceptions had
taken hold. These exceptions, including implied-in-fact con-
tracts arising from policy manuals and public policy, opened a
narrow window for employees to challenge unjust dismissals.
Nevertheless, until Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash-
ington, Inc.,' procedural barriers continued to slam the win-
dow shut on the employee's case.
II. BALDWIN v. SISTERS OF PROVIDENCE
In Baldwin, the Washington Supreme Court examined the
current status of the employment at will doctrine, as well as
the procedural and substantive aspects of wrongful discharge
actions. In that case, the plaintiff, James Baldwin, began
working at St. Peter Hospital, a hospital operated by the Sis-
ters of Providence, in 1981 as a respiratory therapist. Under
the terms of an employment manual produced by the hospital,
employees could be discharged only for "just cause," defined as"any gross violation of conduct."'  The manual also provided a
four-step grievance procedure for resolving employee
complaints.
On January 30, 1985, a patient reported that she had been
sexually molested the previous day. The patient, a woman in
her mid-fifties, told hospital authorities that a bearded man
with a pony tail and wearing a blue jacket entered her room
between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. The man listened to her chest with
a stethoscope. He then massaged the patient's sore left shoul-
der and forced her to massage his genitals.55
The patient reported the incident to hospital staff, who
immediately recognized the physical description of the assail-
ant as that of Baldwin. Furthermore, Baldwin had been on
Dicomes, a case involving a state employee allegedly discharged for reporting an
unannounced budget surplus, the court held that employees have the burden to show
that the discharge contravened a clear mandate of public policy. In addition, the court
ruled that defining a "clear mandate of public policy" in each particular situation is a
question of law. Id. at 617, 782 P.2d at 1006. Factors to be considered are whether the
employer's conduct constituted either a violation of the letter or policy of the law, as
long as the employee was "seeking to further the public good, and not merely private
or proprietary interests, in reporting the alleged wrongdoing." Id. at 620, 782 P.2d at
1008.
53. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989).
54. Id. at 129, 769 P.2d at 299.
55. Brief for Appellant at 4, Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.,
112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989) (No. 54771-8).
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duty that morning, and respiratory therapists were the only
hospital staff members allowed to wear blue jackets.' The
staff member contacted Baldwin's superior, the Director of
Respiratory Therapy, who evaluated the complaint and decided
that a serious problem existed; accordingly, the director told
Baldwin not to come to work that day.
The next morning, Baldwin met with an investigative
team formed by the hospital to handle the incident.57 Baldwin
denied any involvement in the occurrence. 58 The team exten-
sively reviewed the patient's medical records and the hospital
security records and interviewed other staff members. On
February 22, 1985, the hospital terminated Baldwin's
employment.59
Baldwin filed suit against St. Peter Hospital, Sisters of
Providence in Washington, and several hospital administrators
(collectively, "the hospital") on March 18, 1985. Baldwin
alleged, inter alia, that the hospital breached an implied-in-
fact contract that arose from the hospital employment man-
ual's just cause provision. The hospital filed motions for sum-
mary judgment and directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff
was not entitled to judicial review because he had not
exhausted the grievance procedure specified in the employ-
ment manual, and therefore had not exhausted his administra-
tive remedies.60 The trial court denied the defendant's
56. Id. at 5.
57. The team consisted of two codirectors of nursing services, the director of
Personnel, and an assistant to the hospital administrator. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at
129, 769 P.2d at 299.
58. Baldwin again met with the investigatory team on February 6, five days after
the initial complaint was reported, at which time the investigative team informed
Baldwin of what it had learned. Baldwin provided some additional details about his
activities that night and the identities of other staff members who might have seen
him. The team also offered Baldwin the opportunity to take a polygraph test, but
Baldwin refused. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in
Washington, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989) (No. 54771-8).
59. The parties disagreed on the specifics of the dismissal. A meeting was held on
February 22, 1985, to discuss with Baldwin the investigatory team's conclusions.
Baldwin contended that the hospital had already decided to fire him, so he abruptly
left the meeting. The hospital contended that it had not yet made the decision to fire
Baldwin but did so only after Baldwin left the meeting. Id. at 12-13.
60. The hospital argued that Baldwin's claim was not ripe for judicial review
because he had not used the procedures outlined in the employment manual. The
exhaustion of contractual remedies doctrine in the employment setting operates on the
administrative law principle that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
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motions.6 '
At trial on the merits, both parties submitted proposed
jury instructions on the breach of an implied-in-fact contract
issue,62 but the trial court drafted its own instruction. The
court's instruction advised the jury that the hospital was free
to terminate Baldwin's employment at any time and for any
reason unless Baldwin had shown that the hospital had "cre-
ated an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with
promises, found in employment manuals or policies," that
promised certain treatment and induced the employee not to
actively seek other employment.63
The trial court explained that if Baldwin met his burden
of proof by showing that the hospital had created an atmos-
phere of job security, the burden would shift to the hospital to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Baldwin was
terminated for just cause. The trial court adopted an objective
definition of just cause, defining it to mean that, at the time of
the decision, the employer had a "good, substantial and legiti-
mate business reason" for firing the employee. 4
The jury found that Baldwin was excused from resorting
to the grievance procedure because it was futile;6 that the
employment manual contained a requirement of just cause for
dismissal; and that the hospital did not meet its burden of
proving it dismissed Baldwin for just cause.6 The trial court
denied a defense motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and entered judgment in favor of Baldwin. The hospital
appealed the trial court's decision directly to the Washington
Supreme Court. 7
The supreme court first addressed the hospital's argument
61. Superior Court for Thurston County, Robert J. Dornan presiding.
62. Defendants submitted two instructions: the first defined "just cause" as a good
faith, fair, and honest reason supported by substantial evidence. The second added the
objective requirement that the "just cause" determination be reasonable. Baldwin, 112
Wash. 2d at 130, 769 P.2d at 300.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 130-31.
65. Id. at 131. The exhaustion of remedies requirement will often be waived if the
plaintiff could not possibly obtain relief through the prescribed procedures. See Bowen
v. City of New York, 106 S.Ct. 2022 (1986) (Social Security claimants could not discover
why their claims were rejected because the administrative policy was secret); Wolff v.
Selective Serv. Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) (students whose draft deferments
had been revoked were excused from exhausting remedies because the head of the
S.S.S. publicly ruled out any reversals).
66. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 131, 769 P.2d at 300.
67. Id.
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on the issue of the futility of the grievance procedure." The
court found that Baldwin had raised a genuine issue of bias on
the part of the hospital, and, accordingly, he had demonstrated
that recourse to the grievance procedure was futile.69 As a
result, the supreme court, affirming the trial court, found that
Baldwin was entitled to judicial review.7
After finding that Baldwin was entitled to judicial review,
the court reviewed the trial court's jury instructions on the
burdens of proof. The supreme court held that the trial court
erroneously placed the burden on the hospital to prove that
Baldwin was dismissed for just cause.71 The court held that
the ultimate burden of persuasion always rests with the
employee in wrongful discharge cases and that shifting bur-
dens of proof should be applied.72 Specifically, the employee
must establish a prima facie case of a breach of the implied-in-
fact contract. Once the employee makes such a showing, the
burden of producing evidence shifts to the employer to show
that the employee's dismissal was for just cause. If the
employer offers evidence showing just cause, the burden shifts
back to the employee to refute the employer's claim that the
dismissal was for just cause.73
The court then reviewed the trial court's definition of
"just cause. '74 The court concluded that the trial court's objec-
tive definition of just cause was erroneous, finding instead that
just cause means "a fair and honest cause or reason regulated
by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power. 7
5
Thus, the court continued to reject an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in every employment contract,76
which would overturn the at will doctrine by making every
employment relationship terminable only for cause. However,
the court required an element of good faith when an employer
volunteers a "just cause" requirement.
The court's decision in Baldwin presents three major
68. Baldwin contended that the first three steps of the grievance procedure were
unfair because each of the administrators he was required to consult were involved in
the investigation. Id.
69. Id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 134, 769 P.2d at 302.
73. Id. at 133-36, 769 P.2d at 301-03.
74. See text accompanying note 62.
75. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 139, 769 P.2d at 304.
76. Id. at 138, 769 P.2d at 304.
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issues for consideration: the proper allocation of burdens of
proof in wrongful discharge suits; the need for an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts;
and the appropriate definition of "just cause" when an
employer's right to terminate has been so limited.
III. BURDENS OF PROOF IN WRONGFUL DISCHARGE SUITS
Procedural requirements play a vital role in trial strategy
and often determine the outcome of a case. Plaintiffs subject
to demanding procedural requirements frequently are defeated
by a summary judgment or directed verdict because the bur-
dens of production and persuasion make it very difficult to
establish a prima facie case. Any time the burdens upon a
plaintiff are lessened-especially when intermediate burdens
shift to the defendant-the plaintiff's chances of reaching a
full trial on the merits are enhanced. For this reason, the
adoption of shifting burdens in Baldwin is very important:
wrongful discharge plaintiffs are now more likely to reach a
full trial on the merits.
Wrongful discharge cases are a relatively recent phenome-
non, and the proper allocation of the evidentiary burdens is
still developing. However, employment discrimination suits, a
form of wrongful discharge action, provide a useful vehicle for
examining burdens of proof because the United States
Supreme Court has adopted explicit rules on the subject.77
Although technically binding only on federal statutory dis-
crimination claims, the Court's analysis and conclusions have
compelled many jurisdictions to adopt the same standards for
wrongful discharge and discrimination claims of all types.78
77. Cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1990), have proven to be a breeding ground for the development of shifting burdens of
proof in employment cases. Title VII cases are usually categorized into two primary
models, carrying different burdens of proof: disparate treatment or disparate impact.
See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784-85 (1988). Courts
employ the disparate treatment analysis when an individual charges that his employer
consciously treated certain protected individuals in a less favorable manner than
other employees. Disparate impact analysis applies when a plaintiff alleges that a
particular employment practice, although facially neutral, systematically disadvantages
a certain protected group without any particular intention to do so. Id. Because state
wrongful discharge claims usually involve individuals instead of groups, this discussion
will be limited to the disparate treatment analysis. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1980); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
78. See Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97, 570 A.2d 903, 906-
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The seminal Title VII employment discrimination case,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,7 9 established the principles
of burden-shifting most commonly applied in the employment
discrimination context. The court outlined the burdens of
proof appropriate for a private, non-class action Title VII suit
for employment discrimination: first, the plaintiff must estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination;8° once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the employer to articulate some legitimate non-discrimina-
tory reason for the employee's termination;"' finally, the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered
reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.'2 A small
number of jurisdictions have expressly adopted the allocation
of burdens used in employment discrimination cases for use in
wrongful discharge actions. 3 These courts have cited much of
07 (1990) (applying Title VII burdens of proof in state Law Against Discrimination
action); Hamilton v. Department of Ind., Labor & Human Rel., 94 Wis. 2d 611, 621 n.4,
288 N.W.2d 857, 861 n.4 (1980) (applying Title VII burdens of proof in action under the
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act); Cisneros v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 135 Ariz. 301, 302,
660 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1982) (adopting Title VII burdens of proof in Arizona Civil Rights
Act claim); Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 424 Mich. 675, 683, 385 N.W.2d 586, 589 (1986)
(applying Title VII burdens of proof in age discrimination suit under The Fair
Employment Practices Act). Cf. Callan v. Confederation of Oregon School Adm'rs, 79
Or. App. 73, 76, 717 P.2d 1252, 1253-54 (1986) (rejecting application of Title VII burdens
of proof to Oregon anti-discrimination actions).
79. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff had engaged in
disruptive and illegal tactics to protest his recent discharge by the defendant. The
plaintiff, a black civil rights activist, believed his termination and the employer's
hiring practices were racially motivated. Later, the defendant advertised for qualified
personnel, and the plaintiff submitted an application. When the defendant rejected his
application because of the earlier conduct, the plaintiff sued for violation of Title VII.
Id. at 793-94.
80. "The burden of establishing a prima facie case of [discrimination] is not
onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied
for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253.
81. The defendant's burden is only an intermediate evidentiary burden; the
burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. The defendant simply
must set forth reasons for the plaintiff's termination that create a genuine issue as to
whether the employer intended to discriminate. Id. at 254. See also Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (requiring employer to prove that hiring
decision was based on legitimate considerations.)
82. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-03. The Court suggested that compelling
evidence of pretext would include proof that the employer retained or rehired white
employees who were involved in acts of "comparable seriousness." Id. at 804.
83. Schmidly v. Perry Motor Freight, Inc., 735 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1984); Duke v.
Pfizer, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Daubert Coated Products, Inc. v.
Twilley, 536 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. 1988); Crossier v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 150 Cal. App.
3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171
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the same reasoning as the Supreme Court did in its Title VII
discrimination cases.84
A. Burdens of Proof in Washington
The first Washington case to establish burdens of proof in
a wrongful discharge lawsuit was Roberts v. ARCO.85 The
plaintiff in Roberts charged the defendant-employer with age
discrimination in violation of Washington law.' The Washing-
ton Supreme Court, citing federal age discrimination cases,87
delineated the burdens of proof and the evidence required to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The plaintiff
has the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of age
discrimination.' The burden of proof then shifts to the
defendant-employer to show that the employee was discharged
Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.
1987); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988).
84. See Johnson v. Kreiser's Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988), in which the court
applied shifting burdens under the public policy exception to employment at will.
Johnson involved an accountant employed at will by the defendant company. For
several months the accountant noticed that a corporate officer was misappropriating
company funds. The employee was discharged after he criticized the officer's
activities.
The South Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that the plaintiff had been fired
for his refusal to commit a criminal or unlawful act and adopted a narrow public policy
exception to the at will rule. Id. at 227. The court also noted, however, that employers
have a justifiable concern that legitimately discharged employees will use the public
policy exception to file frivolous lawsuits. To safeguard against such abuse, the court
adopted shifting burdens:
the employee has the burden of proving that the dismissal violates a clear
mandate of public policy. Once the employee shows this, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove that the dismissal was for reasons other than those
alleged by the employee. To prevail, the employee must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the discharge was for an impermissible
reason.
Id. at 227-28 (citing Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.
1987)).
Thus, the common law burdens imposed by courts like Johnson are very similar to
statutory discrimination claims, with the exception of an express requirement to show
that the employer's reason was a mere pretext for an impermissible reason.
85. 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
86. Id. at 891, 568 P.2d at 767. WAsH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(2) states: "It is an
unfair practice for any employer... to discharge or bar any person from employment
because of age ......
87. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891, 568 P.2d 764, 767-68 (citing Hodgson v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Assoc., 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Jellef Assoc., 398 F. Supp.
579, 593 (D.D.C. 1974); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86
(5th Cir. 1974)).
88. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d at 892, 568 P.2d at 767.
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for reasons other than age. 9 To present a prima facie case of
age discrimination the plaintiff must show the following: that
he is within the protected age group, that he has been satisfac-
torily performing his work, and that he has been replaced by a
younger person.90
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim because he did not
meet the initial burden.9 ' Although the court never reached
the stage of shifting the burden of proof. to the defendant, the
Roberts formula has been followed and expanded in subse-
quent discrimination and wrongful discharge cases.9"
The Washington Supreme Court applied the shifting bur-
dens of proof principles set forth in Roberts to a common law
wrongful discharge claim in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Com-
pany.93 The Thompson court adopted the public policy excep-
tion to employment at will,94 but the court emphasized the
need to balance the interests of both the employer and
employee.95 To help courts identify "frivolous lawsuits" and
weed out cases that do not involve any public policy concerns,
the court applied the system of shifting burdens.' First, the
89. Id. at 892-93, 568 P.2d at 767-68.
90. Id. at 892, 568 P.2d at 767.
91. Id. at 897, 568 P.2d at 770. The court refused to allow the plaintiff's evidence
that other older employees had been replaced by younger workers, calling the offers
irrelevant and too remote to be of significant value. Id. at 893, 568 P.2d at 768.
92. See Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517
(1988). In Grimrwood, the plaintiff had worked for the defendant for 16 years when he
was fired from his position of Director of Food Services at age 61. Defendants
maintained that plaintiff's job performance had been unsatisfactory and offered as
proof internal memoranda warning of work deficiencies. Plaintiff filed suit alleging
age discrimination, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge.
The Grimwood court, in addressing the discrimination issue, quoted extensively
from McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as well as a case interpreting it, Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979):
While we conclude that McDonnell Douglas provides an appropriate and
workable formula for the trial of age discrimination cases, it should not be
used inflexibly as a vehicle for organizing evidence or presenting a case to a
jury .... McDonnell Douglas was intended to be neither 'rigid, mechanized,
or ritualistic [citations omitted] nor the exclusive method for proving a claim
of discrimination.' "
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014-15; quoted in Grimwood, 110 Wash. 2d at 363, 753 P.2d at
521.
See also Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984);
Adler v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 53 Wash. App. 33, 765 P.2d 910 (1988).
93. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). See supra text accompany notes 40-43
for a factual summary of the case.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
95. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
96. Id. at 232-33, 685 P.2d at 1089.
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employee must prove his dismissal violated a clear mandate of
public policy, one that is recognized legislatively or judicially.9
Placing this initial burden on employees allows employers to
make legitimate personnel decisions without fear of incurring
liability.9" Once the employee has shown that the dismissal
was motivated by reasons inconsistent with a clear mandate of
public policy, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
the dismissal was for reasons "other than those alleged by the
employee."'
While the court in Thompson applied a system of shifting
burdens of proof to Thompson's wrongful discharge case, it did
not articulate which burdens shift. Specifically, the court did
not clarify the proper allocation of the burdens of persuasion
and production. Instead, the Thompson court used ambiguous
language regarding the allocation of burdens as to the public
policy exception, and it did not reach the implied-in-fact con-
tract exception. 100 Because the Thompson court was not suffi-
ciently clear, the court in Baldwin was faced with the task of
determining the proper allocation of evidentiary burdens in a
wrongful discharge action.'
B. Baldwin's Shifting Burdens of Proof
The court's treatment of evidentiary burdens in Baldwin
addressed two distinct issues: burdens of proof and burdens of
persuasion. The court reiterated that in statutory discrimina-
tion claims the initial burden is with the employee to show a
prima facie case of discrimination. 0 2 If the employee is suc-
cessful, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that a legal excuse exists for the termination.'0 3
97. Id. at 233, 685 P.2d at 1089.
98. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
99. Id. at 232-33, 685 P.2d at 1089. The Thompson court did not require the
employer to show that it had a legitimate reason for the dismissal, only that the reason
was not the one charged by the plaintiff. Id. Thus, in theory an employer should be
able to satisfy its burden by proving that the reason, although it may be unjustifiable,
was not in contravention of a "constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or
scheme." Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982),
quoted in Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
100. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
101. The Baldwin court specifically noted that the allocation of the burdens of
persuasion and production in breach of employment contract cases was one of first
impression in Washington. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 112
Wash. 2d 127, 133-34, 769 P.2d 298, 301 (1989).
102. Id. at 134, 769 P.2d at 302.
103. Id.
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However, although the burden of production shifts to the
employer, the court stated that, in employment discrimination
claims, "the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the
employee.' 10 4 This analysis is consistent with the statutory
employment discrimination cases that place the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion on the plaintiff to show that the employer
intentionally discriminated against the employee.0 5
The Baldwin court reasoned that the allocation of the bur-
dens of proof and persuasion used in discrimination actions are
suitable for use in breach of contract claims."° The court
based this conclusion on two propositions. First, "[i]t would be'counterintuitive' to place a lighter burden on employers faced
with wrongful termination claims than on employers charged
with violating statutory discrimination laws."'01 7 Conversely, it
would be inconsistent with "the greater protections the law
attempts to provide alleged victims of discrimination" if
employers were subjected to a greater burden in breach of con-
tract claims.'0 This second reason, however, is of questionable
validity because the court inaccurately cited language from
another case, Duke v. Pfizer, Inc. ,109 to support the two differ-
ent propositions. The Duke court actually stated that placing a
lighter burden on employers accused of discrimination is"counterintuitive and makes little sense in light of the rela-
tively greater protections" for victims of discrimination, 10 a
statement which is consistent with the Baldwin court's first
proposition. However, the Duke court never referred to the
proper burdens upon employers in breach of contract claims.
Therefore, the Baldwin court's basis for refusing to impose a
lighter burden on employees in breach of contract claims is
confusing and without support."'
Nevertheless, the Baldwin court further attempted to
104. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 363,
753 P.2d 517, 521 (1988); Hollingsworth v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 37 Wash. App.
386, 390-91, 681 P.2d 845, 848-49 (1984)).
105. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 303. See text accompanying notes 80-82.
106. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 136, 769 P.2d at 302.
107. Id. at 134, 769 P.2d at 302 (citing Duke v. Pfizer, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1031, 1040
(E.D. Mich. 1987)).
108. Id. at 135, 769 P.2d at 302.
109. 668 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
110. Id.
111. Comparing breach of employment contract suits with Title VII discrimination
claims can also be perilous because of the inherent differences between the claims.
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explain its reasoning, stating that placing the ultimate burden
of persuasion on the party asserting breach will maintain the
balance between the employer's legitimate interest in control-
ling its own business and the employee's interest in retaining
his or her job." 2 The court feared that shifting the burden of
persuasion to the employer to show a proper excuse for the
discharge might encourage employers to remove all language
that could be construed as implying a contract from employee
handbooks. 113 Thus, while an employer must meet its burden
of production to avoid a directed verdict, the conclusive burden
of persuading the factfinder at all times remains with the
employee. 1 14
After determining that the burden of production, not per-
suasion, shifts to the employer, the Baldwin court adopted the
system of shifting burdens set forth in Grimwood v. University
of Puget Sound"5 for use in breach of employment contract
cases:
Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the
employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for termination. The employer's burden at this stage
is not one of persuasion, but rather a burden of production.
To go forward, the employer need only articulate reasons
sufficient to meet the prima facie case. Once the employer
fulfills his burden of production, to create a genuine issue of
material fact the plaintiff must satisfy his ultimate burden of
persuasion and show that the employer's articulated reasons
are a mere pretext for what is in fact, a discriminatory
purpose.116
Although the Baldwin court did not specifically explain
how these burdens would translate from the discrimination
context to a wrongful discharge context, at least one subse-
quent court" 7 provides the following translation. First, the
employee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the discharge was wrongful. To show the discharge was
wrongful, the employee must either demonstrate that 1) the
employer had promised the employee that terminations would
112. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 135, 769 P.2d at 302.
113. Id. at 135-36, 769 P.2d at 302-03.
114. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 303.
115. 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517 (1988).
116. Id. at 363-64, 753 P.2d at 521 (citation omitted), quoted in Baldwin, 112 Wash.
2d at 136, 769 P.2d at 303.
117. See Hibbert v. Centennial Villas, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 889, 786 P.2d 309 (1990).
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be only for just cause (the implied-in-fact contract exception);
2) the employee had given additional consideration in return
for a promise of just cause (the additional consideration excep-
tion); or 3) the employer terminated the employee for a reason
that violates the public policy of the state of Washington (the
public policy exception).
Once the employee has shown that the discharge was
wrongful, the burden of production shifts to the employer,
requiring the employer to show a legitimate reason for the dis-
missal. The legitimacy of the excuse depends upon the excep-
tion relied upon by the employee. Under the implied-in-fact
contract exception or the additional consideration exception,
the employer would need to articulate a legitimate business
reason giving rise to "just cause" for firing the employee. 118
Under the public policy exception, the employer would simply
need to show that the employee was fired for a reason other
than the one alleged by the employee." 9 The proffered reason
would not have to be "legitimate" in the sense that it would
satisfy a "just cause" requirement for the termination; rather,
it need only be a reason that does not violate public policy. 20
If the employer fulfills its burden of production, the burden
shifts again, back to the employee to satisfy his or her ultimate
burden of persuasion by convincing the factfinder that the
employer's stated reasons are merely an excuse for an illegiti-
mate purpose.12 '
Although the Baldwin court misinterpreted its author-
ity, 22 Baldwin's imposition of employment discrimination
shifting burdens on common law wrongful discharge claims is
118. Washington courts have not reached the issue of what dictates just cause in
an "additional consideration" situation. However, logic dictates that in the future,
employers who are obligated under that theory to terminate only for just cause must
fulfill the standard set forth in Baldwin. See Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 138-39, 769 P.2d
at 304.
119. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d at 232-33, 685 P.2d at 1081.
120. For example, in Hibbert, a night nurse at a nursing home was fired after
committing four work-related infractions. The nurse claimed that her dismissal was in
violation of public policy because she had reported conditions of abuse and neglect.
The nurse stated that she had found a piece of glass in a patient's medical ointment
and had reported it to other nurses and the nursing home director.
Applying Baldwin, the Hibbert court stated that the burden was on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer for the plaintiff's discharge
was a mere pretext. Id. at 894, 786 P.2d at 311. The Hibbert court held that the
plaintiff had failed to meet her burden because she did not prove that her employer's
reason was pretextual. Id.
121. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 136, 769 P.2d at 303.
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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a much needed alteration of Washington law. The newly
enunciated burdens make proving that a discharge was wrong-
ful easier for employees, while not being unduly prejudicial
against employers. Certainly, the court could have placed the
burden of persuasion on the employer to prove that the dismis-
sal was for just cause when the employer has created an
implied-in-fact contract through an employee handbook. 123
However, the court correctly determined that it would be
anomalous to place a greater burden on employers in wrongful
discharge cases than in discrimination actions. 124
Moreover, the arguments supporting the Baldwin pre-
scription are compelling. Shifting burdens make the employ-
ment law system more predictable by imposing the same
requirements in discrimination and wrongful discharge actions.
Having different standards is especially complicated in employ-
ment cases because claims often will simultaneously charge a
violation of statute and breach of contract.125 Under Baldwin,
the plaintiff and defendant have a clear statement of the bur-
dens for each claim.126 The Baldwin formulation, while leav-
ing the ultimate burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, furthers
societal goals by creating a more level playing field with regard
to the available evidence, but it does not contradict established
common law principles that plaintiffs must prove all elements
of a cause of action. 1 27
123. See Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Worker's Compensation Claim:
The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HAsT. L.J. 551, 575 (1986). In retaliatory
discharge claims, the burden of persuasion can shift to the defendant-employer
because "the defendant has greater access to the evidence or the defendant is a
wrongdoer and should bear the risk of nonpersuasion." Id. At trial, Baldwin argued
that the burden of persuasion should be on the employer, citing several courts that
have so ruled. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 135, 769 P.2d at 302 (citing Bosche v. Lear
Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 816 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir. 1987); Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.
1987); Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 Or. App. 638, 707 P.2d 1256 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 301 Or. 117, 719 P.2d 854 (1986); Advance Ross Elec. Corp. v. Green, 624
S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982)).
124. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 302. See also Duke v. Pfizer, Inc., 668 F.Supp. 1031, 1040
(E.D. Mich. 1987).
125. See, e.g., Bishop v. Jellef Assoc., 398 F.Supp. 579, 584 (D.D.C. 1974).
126. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298. Compare Note, The Development of
Exceptions To At-Will Employment: A Review of the Case Law From Management's
Viewpoint, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 616, 631 (1982). "[I]ndefinite guidelines will seriously
hamper the employer in his efforts to comply with legal requirements. In the area of
day-to-day decision making, knowing the law in advance is crucial to the smooth
function of business." Id.
127. See Belton, Causation and Burden Shifting Doctrines In Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited.. Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL.
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But perhaps the most important factor in favor of Baldwin
is that these shifting burdens eliminate some of the harshness
inherent in the employment at will doctrine. After Baldwin,
employees can more readily establish a prima facie case of
wrongful discharge. Shifting the burden of production to the
employer is reasonable in that the employer usually has
greater access to pertinent information regarding the reason
for dismissal.12 In addition, the adoption of the burdens used
in discrimination claims implies that the courts are concerned
with protecting employees that have been unjustly terminated
by employers. While breaches of contract are not as socially
reprehensible as discrimination forbidden by statute, it is
encouraging that courts have concluded that an employee's
expectation in continued employment merits special
consideration.
Although the Baldwin system of shifting burdens will not
be welcomed by employers, the system does not completely
turn the tables on businesses. Requiring an employer to pres-
ent a justifiable reason for discharging an employee will not
unreasonably effect the ability of companies to make employ-
ment decisions. Procedurally, although Baldwin made proving
unlawful discharge easier for plaintiffs, employers are still in a
very strong position because the substantive law does not allow
most employees to seek legal redress for wrongful
terminations.'2 9
IV. IMPLIED COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A plaintiff cannot use Baldwin's favorable evidentiary bur-
dens unless he or she has a substantive claim for legal redress.
Procedural improvements are meaningless unless substantive
rights first allow plaintiffs to use them. For this reason, the
L. REV. 1359, 1405 (1990) (observing that altering employment discrimination burdens
in favor of employers is "devastating" to a national policy against discrimination).
128. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-60 n.45
(1977) (noting that the employer was in a better position to explain denial of
employment); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
115 (1985) (recognizing that placing the burden of proving business necessity on the
defendant is traditionally justified because employers have superior access to
employment information); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 443 (W.D. Wis.
1982) (noting that, in disparate treatment cases, the employer has superior access to
proof).
129. Even under the Baldwin court's more accommodating standard, fired
employees still have a difficult time meeting their burden of proof. See Hibbert v.
Centennial Villas, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 889, 786 P.2d 309 (1990).
[Vol. 14:709
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence
Baldwin court's adoption of shifting burdens is a hollow vic-
tory for wrongfully discharged employees. While the court
took a major step toward balancing the procedural rights and
obligations of employer and employee, its refusal to imply a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing continues to bar wrong-
ful discharge claimants from the courtroom.
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.13
An at will employment relationship is, in fact, an employment
contract, albeit one that may be terminated at will by either
party.'3 ' Remarkably, however, the employment relationship
is excepted from the traditional good faith and fair dealing
requirements of ordinary contracts, in large part because of the
at will doctrine. While parties in most contracts are obligated
to act in furtherance of the common purpose of the agreement
and to deal honestly and fairly with each other, 3 2 the at will
doctrine has allowed either party in an employment relation-
ship to terminate the relationship freely. Despite the modern
exceptions to the at will doctrine that .limit the reasons for
which employers can terminate employees,"3 the parties are
still allowed to terminate the employment relationship for vir-
tually any reason, whether justifiable or not.'3
However, some courts, following the trend toward limiting
the at will doctrine, have restricted an employer's right to ter-
minate an at will employee where the discharge was funda-
mentally unfair and occurred under egregious
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1982); Metropolitan Park
Dist. of Tacoma v. Griffith, 106 Wash. 2d 425, 723 P.2d 1093 (1986); Lonsdale v.
Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 662 P.2d 385 (1983).
131. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1982): "Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because
they violate community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness."
133. For a proposal that employees who abuse special positions of trust should be
liable for a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see
Comment, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Examining
Employees' Good Faith Duties, 39 HAST. L.J. 483 (1988).
134. The most obvious question raised by this anomaly is "why are employment
contracts treated differently?" Although the at will doctrine satisfied the economic
needs of its day, it has stubbornly remained the status quo of American employment
law, but not because of persuasive logic or valid policy choices; instead, it owes its
continued existence to the refusal of judges and legislators to limit the ability of
employers to freely terminate employees.
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circumstances.1 5 The first court to imply a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to employment at will was a 1974 New
Hampshire case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 136 Monge involved
a machine operator who alleged that she was fired because she
refused to date a project foreman. Under the traditional at
will doctrine, the plaintiff would not have a cause of action
because the employment was for an indefinite period.'3 7 The
court noted, however, that economic conditions were changing
rapidly and the at will rule did not adequately address the
needs of employees. 3 s
The Monge court advocated a balancing of the employer
and the employee's legitimate concerns: the employer's inter-
est in "running his business as he sees fit" must be balanced
against the employee's interest in "maintaining employ-
ment."'3 9 Accordingly, the court held that a termination of an
at will employee by an employer "motivated by bad faith or
malice," including retaliation, constitutes a breach of the
employment contract. 40 The Monge court justified the rule on
the basis that it afforded the employee a "certain stability of
employment" without interfering with the employer's neces-
sary right to discharge. 141
Unlike Monge, most courts have refused to impose a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing on employment at will.142
However, some courts have followed the lead of New Hamp-
shire and have judicially adopted the implied covenant. In For-
tune v. National Cash Register Company,143 the court granted
135. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See also Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), overruled in part,
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (1988);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980),
overruled in part, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
765 P.2d 373 (1988) (remedy for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing lies only in contract, not tort.)
136. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
137. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552. The Monge court based the action in contract as a
breach of an implied covenant. As a result, the plaintiff was not allowed an award of
damages for mental suffering because such damages are not generally recoverable in
contract actions. Id.
142. See, e.g., Darlington v. General Electric, Inc., 350 Pa. Super. 183, 504 A.2d 306
(1986); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
143. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
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relief for a salesman who was denied commission payments
and then terminated. Although the Fortune court refused to
imply a covenant of good faith in every employment relation-
ship,144 it did find that the employer acted in bad faith by
depriving the employee of his earned commission, and thus
breached the employment contract. 45 However, the Fortune
court, like the Monge court, expressly limited the action to a
contract theory of recovery.L46
While the courts in New Hampshire and Massachusetts
have fashioned a remedy in contract for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Montana and Califor-
nia have taken exceptional steps to provide redress for termi-
nated employees. 147 The treatment of this issue in Montana
and California is important for several reasons: 1) other juris-
dictions have engaged in extensive internal debates over the
propriety of implying a good faith covenant in employment at
will; 2) other states' courts and legislatures have taken an
active role in dismantling the employment at will doctrine
thereby enhancing the job security of at will employees; 3) the
court opinions provide some of the more compelling arguments
for and against the implied covenant; and 4) the current status
of the implied covenant in those states provide possible models
for a future covenant in Washington.
A. The Montana Wrongful Discharge Statute
Even before the Montana legislature adopted the state's
recent Wrongful Discharge Act,148 Montana's common law pro-
vided discharged employees with significant protections from
the harshness of employment at will. In Gates v. Life of Mon-
tana Insurance Co.,149 the Montana Supreme Court recognized
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at will employment
contracts. The Gates court reasoned that, while employers
must have wide latitude to decide whom to employ, the law
should provide employees with some protection against injus-
144. Id. at 1257.
145. Id.
146. "On occasion some courts have avoided the rigidity of the 'at will' rule by
fashioning a remedy in tort. We believe, however, that in this case there is remedy on
the express contract." Id. at 1256.
147. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -914 and Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (1988).
148. MONT. CODE ANN. § § 39-2-901 to -914 (1987).
149. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
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tice. i' ° In Gates, the employer had unilaterally established cer-
tain procedures for termination that fostered in the employee
"the peace of mind associated with job security."''" If the
employer fails to abide by its own policies then, the court
stated, "the peace of mind of its employees is shattered and an
injustice done."'152
In a subsequent appeal, the Montana Supreme Court again
addressed the Gates case."5  The court decided that breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to
an action in tort, rather than in contract.1 " The court rea-
soned that a breach of the implied covenant is a tort action
because the duty to use good faith arose as an "operation of
law .. .
Montana's implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing operates upon objective indications by the employer
that give the employee a reasonable expectation of fair treat-
ment.'" Even if an employee handbook contains a statement
that the employee may be terminated "with or without cause,"
as long as the employee has a reasonable belief that termina-
tion will only be for cause, the implied covenant overrides the
terms of the handbook.157
Although the common law implied in law covenant pro-
vided employees with some protections, the Montana state leg-
islature fundamentally changed the rights of Montana
employees by repealing the Montana at will employment stat-
ute in 1987." The Montana Wrongful Discharge From
150. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 2133 (1983).
154. Id. at 307, 668 P.2d at 215. The Montana statute governing punitive damages
states: "In any action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury
(in addition to actual damages) may give damages for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant." Id. at 307, 668 P.2d at 214-15 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-221 (1989)). Thus, according to the Gates court, punitive damages would be
available in cases that meet the statutory requirement of malice, oppression, or fraud.
155. Id.
156. Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015
(1984).
157. Stark v. Circle K Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162 (1988).
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 10 ch. 641 (1987). The employment at will statute had
previously provided in pertinent part: "An employment having no specified term may
be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, except where
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Employment Act'5 9 furnishes the exclusive remedy and proce-
dures for actions formerly governed by common law require-
ments. It provides a statutorily defined cause of action for
wrongful discharge which allows employees to sue for: (1) dis-
charge in retaliation for an employee's refusal to violate public
policy; (2) discharge in violation of the express provisions of
the employer's written personnel policies; and (3) discharge for
reasons other than good cause as defined in the Act."e In
exchange for increased protections for employees, the Act also
limits an employer's liability to lost wages and fringe benefits
up to four years after discharge, unless the employee can prove
by "clear and convincing evidence that the employer engaged
in actual fraud or actual malice" in discharging the
employee.' 6 '
In essence, the Montana legislature has attempted,
through the Wrongful Discharge Act, to balance an employee's
rights and an employer's liability. The Act codifies certain
common law protections granted to employees, thereby guar-
anteeing employees a cause of action in the specified circum-
stances. At the same time, the Act restricts many of the rights
and remedies afforded employees by earlier Montana court
decisions: punitive damages are harder to attain, only four
years of lost wages are recoverable, and the employee is
required to offset earnings acquired after termination. 2
The Wrongful Discharge Act recently withstood a chal-
lenge to its constitutionality under the Montana constitution.
In Meech v. Hillhaven West; Inc.,163 the plaintiff argued that
the Wrongful Discharge Act unlawfully deprived employees of
otherwise provided by [statute]." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-505 (1985) (repealed by
Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987, ch. 641, § 10).
The last case decided under the former At Will statute was Prout v. Sears,
Roebuck, & Co., 236 Mont. 152, 772 P.2d 288 (1989). The court in Prout observed that
courts had created several exceptions to the at will rule, including an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, to avoid the "harshness" of the statute. Id. at 156, 772
P.2d 290.
159. MONT. CODE ANN. § § 39-2-901 to -914 (1987).
160. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1987). "Good cause" is defined under the Act as
"reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily
perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business
reason." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903 (1987).
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905 (1987). "Interim earnings, including amounts
the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence, must be deducted from the
amount awarded for lost wages." Id.
162. Under the earlier cases, the tort basis of recovery was not restricted by these
requirements and limitations.
163. 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
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the "full legal redress" provided by common law. 1' Depriva-
tion of a common law right of recovery, the plaintiff con-
tended, is interference with a fundamental right protected by
the Montana Constitution."a The Meech court disagreed, hold-
ing that the common law recovery rights for employees are not
"fundamental rights" protected by the Montana Constitu-
tion." Although the Act arguably "took away any possible
right of meaningful recovery" for employees,6 7 it has been
affirmed as the exclusive means for a wrongfully discharged
employee to gain legal redress in Montana."6 Furthermore,
despite these limitations on an employee's right to enforce the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Montana still
remains a national leader in protecting employees from unjust
dismissal.
B. Wrongful Discharge Law in California
In 1980, the California Supreme Court created a tort cause
of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,' 6 9
but refused to decide whether a tort recovery should be avail-
able under an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.0 The issue was decided, however, by a California Court
of Appeals in Cleary v. American Airlines.' The Cleary court
held that an employee arbitrarily discharged after eighteen
years of satisfactory service had a cause of action for wrongful
discharge sounding both in tort and in contract. 172
A subsequent ruling by the California Supreme Court pro-
vided further support for imposing an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing on employment at will. In Seamans
Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co., 17 the California
Supreme Court created a tort action for breach of a commer-
cial contract when the breaching party in bad faith denied the
existence of the contract. The court also intimated that the
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
164. Id. at 26, 776 P.2d at 491.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 42, 776 P.2d at 501.
167. Id. at 57, 776 P.2d at 510 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 24-25, 776 P.2d at 490.
169. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980).
170. Id. at 179, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846, 610 P.2d at 1337.
171. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
172. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
173. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (1984).
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employment relationship might give rise to tort remedies.1 74
Following the Seamans ruling, several California appellate
courts awarded tort damages to employees discharged in bad
faith. 5 In all, eight unanimous court of appeals decisions per-
mitted a tort action for bad faith discharge. 7 ' However,
although the lower courts and commentators accepted the
existence of a wrongful discharge tort, the California Supreme
Court still had not ruled on the issue 1 77 until it decided Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp. 178 in 1988. The Foley case involved a
products manager who was fired from his position after raising
questions about a potential employee's past criminal record.
The plaintiff did not claim to have been guaranteed employ-
ment for a specified duration, but he argued that the conduct
of the defendant company led him to reasonably believe he
would not be fired without just cause.'7 9 The plaintiff filed
suit, alleging both a tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and a contractual breach. A 6-3
majority held that tort remedies are not available for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. i"
On the contract claim, the majority found that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is contractual in nature,
and accordingly, remedies for a breach of the covenant have
traditionally been limited to contract remedies.' 8 ' The Foley
court rejected the Cleary court's comparison of insurance con-
tracts to employment contracts and found that the authority
relied on in Cleary was inopposite. 82 Furthermore, the Foley
174. Id. at 768 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.6, 686 P.2d at 1330 n.6.
175. See, e.g., Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570
(1986) (employee fired on basis of false performance report); Khanna v. Microdata
Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985) (refusal to pay commission and
subsequent dismissal); Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr.
524 (1984) (employee fired for allegedly dating the manager of a rival firm).
176. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 47 Cal.3d 654, 705, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 243, 765
P.2d 373, 405 (1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
177. See Brandon, From Tameny to Foley: Time for Constitutional Limitations on
California's Employment At Will Doctrine?, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 371-72;
Brody, Wrongful Termination as Labor Law, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 434, 442 (1988);
Comment, Workers' Compensation Exclusivity and Wrongful Termination Tort
Damages: An Injurious Tug of War?, 39 HAST. L.J. 1229 (1988).
178. 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (1988).
179. Id. at 663-64, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213, 765 P.2d at 376.
180. Id. at 700, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239, 765 P.2d at 401.
181. Id. at 696, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37, 765 P.2d at 389.
182. First, the majority distinguished employment contracts from insurance
contracts, which had been interpreted to have a tort base for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Second, the majority noted that the previous
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court acknowledged that most jurisdictions refuse to recognize
a tort-based action for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.183
In addition to these arguments based on precedent, the
court argued that breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is actually a breach of a contract obligation
rather than a tort. According to the court, the good faith
requirement is designed to protect the integrity of the contract,
not "some general public policy interest not directly tied to the
contract's purpose."'1 4 Thus, the majority refused to alter the
"fundamentally contractual" nature of employment rela-
tions." While the majority recognized that existing remedy
are insufficient to compensate an employee for the effects of
an unlawful discharge,"s the court justified its restrictive hold-
ing by claiming that a scheme to reward only deserving cases
would be impossible and that any attempt would most likely
lead to "potentially enormous consequences for the stability of
the business community.' 8 7
The three judges writing in dissent,'8 although not agree-
ing on all points, criticized the majority on several grounds.
First, they claimed that a tort remedy for bad faith discharge
was the status quo in California before the Foley decision. 89
Second, they argued that the earlier courts' comparisons of
insurance and employment contracts were legitimate.' 9° Third,
the dissenting judges thought that tort and contractual reme-
dies could coexist.191 Fourth, they criticized the majority for
implying that the legislature should enact a tort remedy for
wrongful discharge when current law already allowed it. 92
Under Foley, terminated employees can still sue for breach
decisions relied upon by Ceary and its progeny did not allow tort recoveries. Id. at
685, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 229, 765 P.2d at 391.
183. Id. The court stated that "the clear majority of jurisdictions have either
expressly rejected the notion of tort damages for the breach of the implied covenant in
employment cases or had impliedly done so by rejecting any application of the
covenant in such a context."
184. Id. at 690, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232, 765 P.2d at 394.
185. Id. at 694, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235, 765 P.2d at 398.
186. Id. at 694, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235, 765 P.2d at 397.
187. Id. at 699, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239, 765 P.2d at 401.
188. Judges Broussard, Kaufman and Mosk wrote separate dissenting opinions.
189. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 703, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 242, 765 P.2d at 403 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
190. Id. at 707, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45, 765 P.2d at 406.
191. Id. at 710, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 247, 765 P.2d at 410.
192. Id. at 713, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49, 765 P.2d at 410.
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of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but their
damage awards are strictly limited by the contract nature of
the claim. As Montana has done, California courts will likely
limit damages to foreseeable lost wages minus mitigation.
Punitive damages, which are sometimes available in Mon-
tana,193 probably will not be allowed in California.' Thus,
although California has recently rolled back some of its com-
mon law protections for employees, the workers of that state
are still granted the ability to combat unfair dismissals in
court.
C. Baldwin's Rejection of An Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
The Washington Supreme Court first addressed the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company.195 The
Thompson court acknowledged that other courts had adopted a
"bad faith" exception for employment contracts, but refused to
follow suit." The court reasoned that such an exception does
not strike the proper balance between "an employer's interest
in running his business as he sees fit" and the "interest of the
employee in maintaining his employment .... ,,'1 Moreover,
the court believed that implying a covenant of good faith in
every employment contract would subject each discharge to
"judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith."' 9'  Although an employer may expressly agree to
restrict its right to discharge an employee, the court stated that
"to imply such a restriction on that right from the existence of
a contractual right, which by its terms has no restrictions, is
internally inconsistent."' 99 The court also viewed an implied-
in-law bad faith exception as judicial overreaching into an area
best left to the parties or the legislature.2"
193. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905 (1987).
194. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40, 765 P.2d at 401.
195. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
196. Id. at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
197. Id. at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
198. Id. (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625,
629 (1982)).
199. Id. at 228, 685 P.2d at 1087.
200. The court stated that finding a good faith covenant would be "an intrusion
into the employment relationship ... [and] merely a judicial substitute for collective
bargaining which is more appropriately left to the legislative process." Id. at 228, 685
P.2d at 1087.
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Unlike the Thompson court, the Baldwin court was not
asked to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing from
Baldwin's employment relationship with the hospital; however,
the court raised the issue on its own.201 The superior court had
rejected a proposed jury instruction that referred to "good
faith" in defining "just cause" because the judge believed such
an instruction would be inconsistent with Thompson's rejection
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 2 The
Baldwin court distinguished an employer who voluntarily
chooses "good faith" as a standard of review for just cause
from the situation in which a court implies a covenant of good
faith into every employment relationship. ° s The Baldwin
court restated the reasoning of the Thompson court in
rejecting such an implied covenant as "inherently inconsistent"
with the contractual right to discharge an employee, which has
no restriction.2 4
The Washington Supreme Court's rationale in Thompson
and Baldwin to reject an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the employment relationship is both insufficient
and unsupportable. It is insufficient in light of the extensive
treatment afforded this issue in other jurisdictions, most nota-
bly California and Montana. The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is a potential vehicle for better protecting
the employment security of thousands of employees who do
not have the bargaining power to insist on express guaran-
tees.205 As such, the covenant deserved more discussion and
deliberation than afforded it by the Supreme Court in Thomp-
son and Baldwin.
201. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 137,
769 P.2d 298, 303 (1989). The Washington Supreme Court earlier had reiterated its
position that employment at will contracts do not contain implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing. Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 109 Wash. 2d 747, 748 P.2d 621
(1988). In Willis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the supreme court
the question of whether there is an implied covenant of good faith in a terminable at
will contract. Relying on Thompson, the court answered in the negative. Id. at 752,
748 P.2d at 624.
202. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 137, 769 P.2d at 303 (1989). See infra section V for a
discussion of the "just cause" issue.
203. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 137, 769 P.2d at 303.
204. Id. at 148, 769 P.2d at 304.
205. Determining the exact number of unjust dismissals in a given year is
impossible. However, one commentary estimates that in 1981, nationwide
approximately 140,000 nonunionized workers with more than six months' service were
terminated without just cause. Steiber and Murray, Protection Against Unjust
Discharge: The Need For A Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 324 (1983).
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In effect, the Washington Supreme Court has given three
reasons for not adopting a covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing: (1) a need to control judicial activism in the employment
context; (2) maintaining the balance between employer and
employee; and (3) the inherent inconsistency of implying a
contractual right in an otherwise unrestricted contract. These
three reasons, however, are by-products of the same base argu-
ment: that the at will doctrine is still, if it ever was, good pol-
icy. The court's reasoning is therefore insufficient because it
dresses up one argument three different ways to argue the
same point. What makes the court's treatment of the issue so
troubling, however, is not that it relies on only three argu-
ments borne from the same theory, but that its entire rationale
is self-validating, and thus, unsupportable.
Simply put, the court operates from the premise that the
employment relationship is fundamentally different from
other contracts because it is freely terminable by either party.
This is the traditional 19th Century view of the at will doctrine
as developed by Horace Wood.2" Implying a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in at will employment would abrogate
the at will doctrine. Faced with this prospect, the court
attacked the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
using three legal truths that have resulted from the at will
doctrine but were not reasons for the doctrine in the
beginning.
First, the court feared that an implied covenant would
encourage judicial activism in the employment context, which
is better left to the legislature. 0 7  This is true. Judicial
involvement in questions of "bad faith" would necessarily
increase. But it is only in employment relationships that
courts have not been active in identifying the terms and fulfill-
ment of contracts. 20 8 The judiciary removed itself from the
employment relationship in response to the at will doctrine,
but that gives no explanation as to why the doctrine should
continue.
206. See supra note 5-11 and accompanying text.
207. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 227, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087
(1984).
208. For example, courts have long been willing to examine the meaning of
collective bargaining agreement and specific written employment contracts. See, e.g.,
Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wash. 2d 509, 110 P.2d 182 (1942) (collective
bargaining agreement); O'Donnell v. Sipprell, 163 Wash. 369, 1 P.2d 322 (1931) (specific
duration contract).
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The second rationale used by the court fails for the same
reason. The court reasoned that an implied-in-law covenant
would upset the balance between employer and employee
because determining good faith in every discharge would inter-
fere with the employer's ability to run his business as he saw
fit.' This conclusion also rises from the traditional at will
rule and the economic circumstances that created it. The at
will doctrine was initially advocated because workers were
more likely to switch occupations during the latter stages of
westward expansion and industrialization.2"0  Times have
changed. Employees now depend in most cases on their job for
financial security. 11 Courts and legislatures have recognized
the necessity to limit the authority of employers to freely ter-
minate employees by adopting numerous exceptions to the at
will rule.2 2 These exceptions protect employees from unjust
termination when the reasons for dismissal are deemed suffi-
ciently "unfair," such as when the firing is discriminatory or
against public policy. Adopting a good faith covenant would
merely extend this protection to other "unfair" terminations.
This second argument also relies on the at will doctrine
for its validity. Over one hundred years ago courts decided
that an employer should be free to make employment deci-
sions about at will employees without restriction. In effect, the
"balance" between employers and employees was arbitrarily
created by the at will rule and was based on conceptual notions
of mutuality. But in the modern world, the "balance" actually
weighs in favor of the employer because employees and
employers rarely occupy equal bargaining positions. The reali-
ties of our current economic system require a more responsive
approach to unfair dismissals.
Third, the court's statements in Thompson and Baldwin
that restricting the employer's right to discharge is "internally
inconsistent" simply does not make sense. It is a general prin-
ciple that all contracts include an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.213 The at will employment relationship
is actually an employment contract that is freely terminable by
209. Id. at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
210. See Blades, supra note 13.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 205 (1982); Metropolitan Park
Dist. of Tacoma v. Griffith, 106 Wash. 2d 425, 723 P.2d 1093 (1986); Lonsdale v.
Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 662 P.2d 385 (1983).
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either party.214 Because of the at will doctrine, employment
contracts have been excepted from this rule. While it is not
"internally inconsistent" to imply good faith in other contracts,
the court stated that such an implication is inconsistent in the
employment context. Again, the at will doctrine validates
itself. The hollowness of the argument is exposed when all the
logical steps are laid out: the at will doctrine allows both par-
ties to an employment contract to terminate freely the rela-
tionship. Limiting the rights of an employer to dismiss its
employees would create restrictions on the rights of the par-
ties. Therefore, the employment at will doctrine and any
restrictions upon the rights of the parties are incompatible.
However, this argument blindly assumes that employment at
will is an unassailable truth. The question that needs to be
asked is whether the at will doctrine continues to makes sense.
Employment at will is no longer a viable employment law
doctrine."' 5 Year by year, more states create exceptions to it.
Commentators call for statutory provisions that would allow
wrongfully terminated employees legal redress.21 The nature
of the modern employment relationship imports a special duty
on behalf of the employer.217 While historically employees
may have had a more equal bargaining position, today's eco-
nomic structure often requires employees to rely on his or her
current job for financial security and peace of mind.218 Fur-
thermore, an employee fired from the job is no longer free to
enter the marketplace in many instances. For example, what
kind of market is there for a factory worker who has worked
twenty years at the same plant?21 9
214. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
215. See Steiber and Murray, supra note 205, at 321.
216. Id.; Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time For a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Minda & Raab, Time For An Unjust Dismissal
Statute in New York, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1137 (1989).
217. "I can think of no relationship in which one party, the employee, places more
reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or is more vulnerable to
abuse the other, than the relationship between employer and employee." Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 718, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 253, 765 P.2d 373, 414-15
(Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
218. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d 876,
878 (1981) ("With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operation and
employing relatively immobile workers who often have no other place to market their
skills, recognition that the employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is
realistic.")
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (1982), prohibiting age discrimination in
employment: "[I]n the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
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An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
raise the specter of making every termination subject to judi-
cial scrutiny. However, as in any field where courts become
involved, safeguards can be erected against abuse 2 °0 The same
argument was made against adoption of anti-discrimination
laws, but the only remaining debate now is over the definition
of discrimination, not the need for courts to protect against
it. 221 Even if employment termination decisions are scrutinized
more often, the objective is worth the added inconvenience and
expense.222 Every day, hard-working employees lose their jobs
for unfair reasons. Protecting the reasonable job security of
our citizens may cause some inconvenience for employers, but
that is a price we ought to pay.
V. THE MEANING OF JUST CAUSE
As noted in Section I, sometimes an employer unilaterally
agrees to terminate an employee only for just cause. This is
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts ... to regain employment when displaced
from jobs."
220. See infra text accompanyng note 246-47.
221. Pro-management commentators have used the increase in civil rights
litigation as support for a continuation of employment at will. See Comment, The
Development of Exceptions To At Will Employment A Review of the Case Law From
Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 616 (1982) (stating that calls for
restrictions on civil rights actions indicate that similar calls would be made if all
employment terminations were also litigable). While one might argue that current
civil rights legislation has allowed abuses of the system and excessive litigation, civil
rights remedies are valuable and necessary. Similarly, protection against wrongful
termination may create areas for abuse and an increase of lawsuits, but that possibility
speaks to future restrictions on the cause of action, not a complete rejection of the
remedy itself.
222. Cf. Comment, Employer Opportunism And the Need for a Just Cause
Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 510 (1989). The author questioned the need for a general
good cause standard under a law and economics approach. While the author
acknowledged that employers may find it profitable to discharge productive workers to
recapture bonuses, he nevertheless criticized the efficiency of a general good cause
standard. Specifically, "in the general case where the employer's motive is only
implicit, information problems for the fact finder make the remedy much more
costly." Id. at 528.
The author also argued that any gains resulting from a good cause standard would
likely be offset by unpleasant side effects for employees, such as a potential decrease
in employment due to the higher costs associated with a just cause standard. Id. at 529.
This argument asks terminable at will employees to suffer a Pyrrhic victory:
employees should be content with an employment doctrine that allows the employers
to terminate them without good cause because doing so allows that employer to hire
more people. Perhaps wrongfully terminated employees should take solace in the fact
that they will have an easier time finding another job as a result of the doctrine that
allowed them to be fired in the first place.
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence
usually done through employee handbooks or oral promises.
In Baldwin, for example, a promise to discharge only for just
cause was made in an extensive employee handbook provided
by the employer.223 Although the hospital's handbook defined
just cause as "any gross violation of conduct, ' 224 the supreme
court considered a two-fold issue of first impression in Wash-
ington: first, the court considered how "just cause" in employ-
ment terminations is defined; and second, the court addressed
the issue of who should decide, factually, whether "just cause"
has been satisfied.22 5
The parties in Baldwin stipulated that sexual abuse of a
patient is just cause for termination; nevertheless, the court
reviewed the instructions on "just cause" that were given to
the jury. The superior court defined just cause as "a good, sub-
stantial and legitimate business reason for terminating the
employment of a particular employee.""22  The hospital
objected to this instruction because it allowed the jury to make
an independent assessment of just cause. The supreme court
agreed, stating that "an employer's agreement to restrict dis-
charges to those supported by just cause should not be fol-
lowed by a further judicial implication which takes the
determination of just cause away from the employer. '22 1
However, the court noted that, although "just cause" pro-
visions on their face have no restriction, the employer should
not be allowed to make "arbitrary determinations of just
cause." 228 The court instead held that a standard that "checks
the subjective good faith of the employer with an objective rea-
sonable belief standard strikes a balance between the
employer's interest in making needed personnel decisions and
the employee's interest in continued employment. '229  The
court feared that a purely objective standard would encourage
223. Baldwin v. Sisters v. Providence in Washington, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 129,
769 P.2d 298, 299 (1989).
224. Id. at 129, 769 P.2d at 299.
225. Id. at 137, 769 P.2d at 303 (quoting Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293
Or. 96, 100, 643 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1982)).
226. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 299.
227. Id. at 138, 769 P.2d at 304. The court relied on the Oregon case of Simpson v.
Western Graphics Corp.: "The meaning intended by the drafter, the employer, is
controlling and there is no reason to infer that the employer intended to surrender its
power to determine whether facts constituting cause for termination existed."
Simpson, 293 Or. 96, 100-01, 643 P.2d 1276, 1279.
228. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 138, 769 P.2d at 304.
229. Id. at 139, 769 P.2d at 304 (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1984)).
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employers to remove such provisions from their handbooks
and, thus, frustrate many of the policies advocated in Thomp-
son v. St. Regis Paper Company.2s°
The Baldwin court then adopted the defendant's proposed
instruction on just cause:
"]ust cause" is defined as a fair and honest cause or
reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exer-
cising the power .... based on facts that (1) are supported
by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the
employer to be true and also (3) is not for any arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal reason.23'
The Baldwin court's definition of just cause is a step for-
ward from the earlier practice of allowing employers to create
their own definition and make the factual determination of
whether that standard has been met.232 The court wisely con-
cluded that the judicial branch has an obligation to serve as an
interpreter of contract provisions between employers and
employees when disputes arise. Employers may no longer
make promises of fair treatment while reserving the right to
unilaterally decide the meaning of fairness. Under the law
announced in Baldwin, if an employer includes a just cause
provision in its firing procedures, it must abide by the "fair and
honest cause... regulated by good faith" standard. 3
Unfortunately, this new standard does not go far enough
to adequately protect the rights of employees.2 1 It is insuffi-
cient because the subjective good faith element still allows
employers to discharge an employee for no justifiable reason.
The result is that an unjustly fired employee can not find legal
relief in Washington courts when the employer terminates in
good faith. The law should read that an employee wrongfully
230. Id.
231. Id. at 137, 769 P.2d at 303.
232. Generally, employers can justify dismissals by proving that the employee
committed a wrong and that the wrongdoing justified termination. Comment,
Employment At Will : Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62
WASH. L. REV. 151, 165 (1987). The employee must not only have committed the
conduct in question, but the conduct must be prohibited by a work rule or be the type
of behavior that a reasonable employee would expect to result in termination. Id.
233. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 139, 769 P.2d at 304.
234. The actual impact of the Baldwin court's formulation of "just cause" is not
yet clear. A recent case refused to apply the Baldwin definition because it had
previously held "just cause" was not required for the discharge in question.
Siekawitch v. Washington Beef Producers, Inc., 58 Wash. App. 454, 793 P.2d 994 (1990).
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discharged, no matter what the employer's mindset, s5 is enti-
tled to relief. The court believed that the new standard bal-
ances the interests of the employers and employees, but that is
true only in the sense that the court took rights away from the
former and gave to the latter. The new law still allows
employers in some cases to terminate employees for illegiti-
mate reasons. The proper balance would only be met by
allowing employees to keep their jobs when no justifiable rea-
son for termination exists. 36
Further, the Baldwin standard allows two injustices to go
unremedied. First, it expressly allows an employer to make an
improper decision to terminate if the decision is made in good
faith. Second, it refuses to compensate a plaintiff who has lost
his job for an unjustified reason. A straight objective standard
would establish that an employee promised fair treatment will
receive absolute protection from unjust dismissal.
The court should have adopted a definition of just cause
similar to that adopted in Montana. The Montana Unjust Dis-
missal statute defines "good cause" as "reasonable job-related
grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily per-
form job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or
other legitimate business reasons. ' 23" This definition more
235. Reference to the "employer's mindset" means the employer's state of mind at
the time of dismissal, not in the making of workplace rules. Case law has established
that management has a fundamental right to establish reasonable workplace rules that
are related to a legitimate management objective. F. ELKouRi & E. ELKOURI, How
ARBrrRATION WORKS, at 553 (4th ed. 1985).
236. See Abrams and Nolan, Toward A Theory of "Just Cause" In Employee
Discipline Cases, DuKE L.J. 594, 611 (1985). Abrams and Nolan persuasively argue
that employers should only be allowed to discipline their employees when they have
objective "just cause." "Just cause" exists only when an employee has failed to meet
his obligations under the fundamental understanding of the employment relationship.
An employee's general obligation to provide satisfactory work has four elements:
1. Regular attendance;
2. Obedience to reasonable work rules;
3. A reasonable quality and quantity of work; and
4. Avoidance of conduct, either at or away from work, which would
interfere with the employer's ability to carry on the business effectively.
Id. at 611-12. Adapting this formulation to employee dismissals provides a desira-
ble framework for understanding what "justifies" an employer's decision to terminate.
If an employee satisfies each of the four criteria, the interests of the parties-both the
employer and the employee--are best served by maintaining the employment
relationship.
237. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5). MONT. CODE ANN. 39-2-904 further states:
A discharge is wrongful only if (1) it was in retaliation for the employee's
refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy; (2)
the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the
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clearly states the requirements than the Baldwin court's "reg-
ulated by good faith" standard. More importantly, it empha-
sizes the basic right of an employee to fair treatment when he
has received assurances from his employer.
The court also could have drawn a definition from the vast
body of law involving collective bargaining and arbitration."3
Perhaps the most practical definition of "just cause" was a two-
stage reasonableness standard created by a federal court inter-
preting the protection given returning war veterans: first,
"that it is reasonable to discharge employees because of certain
conduct" and second, "that the employee had fair notice,
express or fairly implied, that such conduct would be ground
for discharge. '23 9
Obviously, these alternative definitions are objective stan-
dards which do not take into account the "good faith" of the
employer, unlike the Baldwin standard. Thus, under these
definitions, the employer's reasonable belief would no longer
be "regulated by good faith. ' 240  Such a definition would
remove the ambiguity existing in the current "just cause" stan-
dard and give employees a better idea of what to expect from
their employer.
VI. THE SOLUTION: AN UNJUST DISMISSAL STATUTE
For the most part, employment at will has been created,
developed, and most recently, weakened by the courts. Judi-
cial interpretation and modification of the rule has resulted in
an ambiguous and complex body of law that fails to meet the
needs of a modern post-industrial society.
Employment at will has survived, albeit in a mutated
form, in large part because courts do not like to overturn well-
established precedent.241 For this reason, and not for any ben-
employer's probationry period of employment; or (3) the employer violated
the express provisions of its own written personnel policy.
(emphasis added).
238. See Summers, supra note 216.
239. Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
240. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 139,
769 P.2d 298, 304 (1989).
241. In the last two decades, courts have taken some steps to limit the harshness
of the employment at will, but begrudgingly so. Several factors have pressured courts
to overturn established precedent. First, the increasing specialization of modern
business has all but eliminated any remaining theory of mutuality between employer
and employees. Second, pensions and statutory benefits have created incentives for
long-term employment. Third, collective bargaining and other statutory protections
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eficial policy interest, employment at will has remained the
controlling doctrine of employment law for over 100 years.
The solution, therefore, lies with the legislature.A Washing-
ton should develop and pass a comprehensive Unjust Dismissal
Statute designed to protect the legitimate rights of employees.
Montana has already done so,24s and proposals are currently
before legislatures in several other states.2'
An Unjust Dismissal Statute in Washington should include
the following elements:
A. Just Cause Standard: The statute should mandate a
standard that focuses on whether the discharge was fair under
the circumstances. 24 A trained arbitrator would be able to
examine the facts in each case to determine whether the dis-
charge was reasonable.
B. Mediation-Arbitration: The statute should encourage
unjust dismissal opponents to settle their cases outside of
court.' Continual litigation would cost exorbitant amounts of
money and further backlog the courts. A well-planned Unjust
Dismissal Statute would detail procedures for claimants to sub-
mit their disputes to an arbitration or mediation board. The
best scheme would involve a mediator-arbitrator who would
conduct an informal hearing integrating negotiation and
adjudication.2 7
have forced courts to afford private sector employees similar protections as those in
the public sector. See Comment, Employment At Wilk" An Analysis and Critique of
the Judicial Role, 68 IOWA L. REv. 787 (1983).
242. Many European nations, which are not saddled with the baggage of
employment at will, have instituted a just cause requirement through legislative
process. See STEIBER, PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUST DISMISSAL: A COMPARATIVE
VIEW, 169 School of Labor And Industrial Relations Research Reprint Series 231-32
(Mich. St. Univ. 1979-80) (Denmark, Sweden, West Germany, Great Britain, Norway,
France, Italy and Ireland have provided for just cause by statute in employment
terminations).
243. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
244. These states include: New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and California.
245. Minda and Raab, supra note 216, at 1188. Minda and Raab provide an
excellent analysis of three different approaches to wrongful dismissal: universal just
cause protection; protection only against abusive discharges; and protection only
against discharges contravening public policy. They conclude that the universal model
based on an objective "just cause" requirement is the best theory for statutory action.
For a discussion of this model, see supra note 236.
246. The Montana Wrongful Discharge Act offers plaintiffs the option of seeking
arbitration. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1987). Minda and Raab believe that
effective legislation must specify arbitration as an exclusive remedy. Minda and Raab,
supra note 216, at 1195.
247. See Comment, supra note -. The authors of that Comment provide an
excellent model statute. Under their proposal, claims by the parties are presented to
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C. Damages: In keeping with the fact that unjust dismissal
cases arise under varying circumstances, the legislation should
provide flexible remedies that can be determined on the facts
of each case. Damages should include back pay with interest,
reinstatement when appropriate' and severance pay when
reinstatement is inappropriate,249 attorney's fees, and costs to
prevailing parties.25°
VII. CONCLUSION
Employment at will has dominated employment for over
one hundred years, but its rigid principles have prevented
courts from taking necessary steps to protect employees from
unjust dismissal. As the court in Baldwin v. Sisters of Provi-
dence demonstrates, precedent and doctrine have constrained
courts to such an extent that they have been unable to create
an appropriate body of law regulating indefinite employment.
The Baldwin decision, which was constrained by earlier
court decisions such as Thompson v. St. Regis Paper, demon-
strates the courts' willingness to develop a fair system, but
also, their inability to break from tradition. For that reason,
the legislature should assume responsibility for creating a fair,
precise and comprehensive statute that gives Washington
an individual arbitrator-mediator. Because the proceedings are informal-the rules of
evidence are relaxed and attorneys need not be present-the arbitrator-mediator can
take a more active role in the proceedings. After the initial presentation of the
dispute, the arbitrator-mediator makes a preliminary assessment of the case. The
parties then commence mediation on the basis of the initial assessment. If the
arbitrator-mediator concludes that settlement is impossible, he must adjourn the
proceedings and issue an opinion within 30 days. Id. at 430.
248. A common perception is that most wrongfully terminated employees would
prefer to take their old jobs back. Nevertheless, half of those employees who
eventually obtain an order of reinstatement under the National Labor Relations Act
reject the offer. West, The Case Against Reinstatement In Wrongful Discharge, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 64 (1988).
West also persuasively argues that reinstatement remedies are an ineffective
deterrent for future wrongful behavior because it costs the employer nothing extra to
hire back the fired employee. Id.
249. Another possibility would be a preventative approach. The legislation could
discourage illegal discharges by requiring due process hearings prior to any
termination. Id. Of course, this system would create much higher operating costs for
employers, and most critically, would effect every employer's decision to dismiss, even
when just cause exists.
250. Minda and Raab, supra note 216, at 1196. Consistent with Washington law,
punitive damages should not be available because the scope of potential liability would
place too great a burden on employers trying to make personnel decisions. See
Comment, The Development of Exceptions To At Will Employment: A Review of the
Case Law From Management's Viewpoint 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 616, 632 (1982).
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employees what they deserve: reasonable job security and
peace of mind.
Michael T Zoretic
